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The goal of this thesis is to determine the efficacy of employing Machine Learn-
ing (ML) to solve Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) CC-0575, which aims
to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the Global Positioning System
(GPS) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) environment. With the growing popular-
ity of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), ML solutions are quickly gaining traction
in businesses, academia and government. This in turn allows for problem solutions
that were previously inconceivable using the classical programming paradigm. This
thesis proposes a method to develop a COP of the battlefield via ANN ingestion of
multiple-source signals and sensors.
We conduct three separate experiments with varying amounts of EMI interference
sources (single, double, and triple jammer datasets). The type of ANN developed to
address this problem is a Conditional Neural Process (CNP) with residual connec-
tions. The model is developed to provide the estimated EMI environment as well as a
measure of confidence in its estimates, as the specific application of this model could
lead to loss of life in the event the model estimates are taken as truth. The model
resulted in an EMI estimator that was neutral on the single jammer test data set, yet
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Electromagnetic Interference Estimation via Conditional Neural Processing
I. Introduction
1.1 Problem Background
The goal of this thesis is to determine the efficacy of employing Machine Learning
(ML) to solve Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) CC-0575. A JUON is a need
prioritized by a combatant commander and is defined as a need requiring a solution
that, if left unfilled, could result in the loss of life and/or prevent the successful
completion of a near-term military mission [1]. JUON CC-0575 specifically calls
for development of a Common Operating Picture (COP) for the battlefield. The
COP will provide an Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Global Positioning System
(GPS) capability that will integrate multiple-source signals and sensor data with
a visualization capability. This tactical capability will inform mission planners and
combat operators in an air or land domain to avoid degraded tactical mission planning
deficiencies resulting from unanticipated EMI events. In order to address JUON CC-
0575, we will develop a machine learning solution, specifically an Artificial Neural
Network (ANN), to integrate multiple-source signals and sensor data with the intent
to develop a battlefield COP.
1.2 Research Objectives
At the time of this writing the Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC) is de-
veloping a solution for JUON CC-0575. The objective of this thesis is to develop
a framework for implementing ANNs to integrate multiple-source signals and sensor
1
data from a helicopter traversing an EMI challenged environment in order to develop
a COP of the battlefield. The aforementioned framework embodies various modern
techniques such as residual networks and Conditional Neural Processes (CNPs). In
addition to developing a COP of the battlefield, visualization of the confidence of the
ANN has been added as an additional objective.
1.3 Document Overview
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter II is a review of information and literature that is pertinent to under-
standing various concepts that this thesis is composed of. Chapter III is the method-
ology chapter of this thesis, explaining dataset generation, ANN architecture, ANN
training, before ending with methods of analysis. Chapter IV applies the previously
discussed ANN framework to an EMI estimation problem. ANN training and test
results are presented and discussed. Chapter V provides a summary of the results
and a short discussion of possible avenues for future work as a result of this research.
2
II. Background and Literature Review
This literature review outlines information and literature that is pertinent to un-
derstanding various concepts that this thesis is composed of. Five main sections are
presented and summarized. The first section, Section 2.1, is a background on Global
Positioning System (GPS). Section 2.2 is an overview of GPS receivers. Section 2.3
discusses various GPS signal interference sources, while Section 2.4 discusses tech-
nologies to detect and locate them. Section 2.5 provides an overview of Machine
Learning (ML) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). The final section, Section 2.7
discusses simulation software used to generate the data used for this thesis research.
2.1 Global Positioning System
Global Positioning System (GPS) is a network of earth orbiting satellites that
was originally developed by the US Department of Defense (DoD) for precise time
transfer as well as improved navigation and positioning for military purposes. The
first satellite was launched in 1978, while the system was declared fully operational
in April of 1995 [2]. The GPS is comprised of three segments: the space segment,
the control segment, and the user segment. Both the space and control segments are
controlled by the DoD and are responsible for the satellites themselves, as well as
the management of satellite operations. The user segment covers the research and
development of military and civil GPS user equipment.
2.1.1 Space Segment
The space segment is comprised of a constellation of satellites that are distributed
throughout six orbital planes inclined at 55 degrees relative to the equatorial plane.
Each orbital plane has four slots distributed unevenly to house primary satellites, as
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well as additional slots for spare satellites as seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Expandable 24-Slot GPS Satellite Constellation [3]
The current operational GPS constellation is a mixture of legacy and modern
satellites launched between the years 1997-2020 [3]. These satellites continuously
broadcast extraordinarily weak earth-bound ranging signals. Table 1 summarizes the
received minimum Radio Frequency (RF) signal strength for Block IIA, IIR, IIR-M,
IIF, and III satellites with respect to a 20.46MHz bandwidth.




P(Y) C/A or L2C
IIA/IIR
L1 -161.5 dBW -158.5 dBW
L2 -164.5 dBW -164.5 dBW
IIR-M/IIF
L1 -161.5 dBW -158.5 dBW
L2 -161.5 dBW -160.0 dBW
III
L1 -161.5 dBW -158.5 dBW
L2 -161.5 dBW -158.5 dBW
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2.1.2 Control Segment
The control segment is a global network of ground-based monitoring facilities
that provide the following services: Space Vehicle (SV) orbit monitoring, SV health
monitoring and maintenance, GPS time maintenance, SV ephemerides and clock pa-
rameter predictions, SV navigation message updates, and SV orbit adjustments [4].
The Master Control Station (MCS) is located at the Schriever Air Force Base and
provides all GPS command and control functions. The Air Force has several moni-
toring stations spread around the globe, allowing operators to view each SV from at
least two monitoring stations continually.
Figure 2: Control Segment Layout [4]
5
2.1.3 User Segment
The user segment is composed of the military and civil GPS receivers that ingest
the signals broadcast from satellites to derive a Position Navigation and Timing
(PNT) solution. Receivers are a very complex combination of hardware and software
subsystems that are used to extract a signal from beneath the noise floor and perform
signal processing to produce a position solution to the user. GPS receivers are one-
way communication devices, only tracking signals transmitted by satellites, and never
transmitting signals back to the satellites. The accuracy of a typical GPS receiver’s
solution is dependent on various capabilities and is detailed in Table 2.
Table 2: GPS receiver accuracy by capability
Mode Horizontal Accuracy (drms)
Stand-Alone
Civilian Receiver / With WAAS 2-3 m / 0.5-1 m
Military Receiver (Dual Frequency) 2 m
Differential
Code Differential 1-2 m
Carrier-Smoothed Code Differential 0.1-1 m
Precise Carrier-Phase (kinematic) 1-2 cm
Precise Carrier-Phase (static) 1-2 mm
The following section will go into more detail on GPS receiver design and functionality.
2.2 GPS Receiver Functionality
Global Positioning System (GPS) signals are transmitted via Medium Earth Or-
bit (MEO) satellites, approximately 20,200 km above the Earth’s surface, and the
received power is on the order of –160 dBW. This signal power can be compared to
the energy received from a 25 watt light bulb from a distance of 11,000 miles away
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[5]. A GPS receiver is designed to track these signals, calculate the distance to each
satellite in view, and use information that is modulated onto said signal to deduce
its own location. This operation is based on a mathematical principle called trilater-
ation. Figure 3 provides an illustration of a GPS receiver functional block diagram.
The remainder of this section will briefly discuss key components of the GPS receiver.
Figure 3: GPS Receiver Functional Block Diagram
2.2.1 Antenna
The antenna collects the signals transmitted by satellites and converts the incom-
ing electromagnetic waves into electric currents. Antennas are also responsible for
initial frequency filtering, that is, depending on the use case the antenna can be de-
signed to collect only the L1 frequency, L1 and L2, or all signals, including L5. Due to
the Right-Hand Circularly Polarized (RHCP) nature of GPS signals, GPS antennas
are RHCP as well, which provides a degree of multi-path mitigation via rejection of
Left-Hand Circularly Polarized (LHCP) multi-path signals. An important antenna
parameter is directivity, which is a measure of how directional the radiation pattern




The preamplifier is low noise amplifier, which is the first place the signal is am-
plified, thus setting the noise floor. It also can provide burnout protection to the rest
of the receiver components downstream by means of a built-in limiter or inline filters
such as pass-band and stop-band filters. The preamplifier is typically built into the
antenna, but this is not required.
2.2.3 Down-converter
The down-converter is responsible for converting an input Radio Frequency (RF)
signal to a predetermined Intermediate Frequency (IF) that is easier to work with from
a signal processing standpoint. Down-conversion can be applied in a single stage or
in multiple stages. Out of band filtering and Continuous Wave (CW) interference
rejection can also be applied during the down-conversion stage.
2.2.4 Reference Oscillator and Frequency Synthesizer
The reference oscillator, often referred to as the clock, oscillates at a preset fre-
quency and provides fundamental timing to the receiver. Many GPS receivers imple-
ment a 10.23 MHz oscillator, as that is the fundamental frequency of GPS signals.
The frequency synthesizer is an electronic circuit that is implemented to generate a
range of reference frequencies from the output of the reference oscillator.
2.3 GPS Signal Interference
Signal jamming, whether it be intentional or not, is one of the two largest threats
when it comes to navigating using Global Positioning System (GPS) (with spoofing
being the other). Signal jamming involves the use of Radio Frequency (RF) trans-
mitters to increase the targeted environment’s noise level, or to overload a receiver’s
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front-end electronics, ultimately resulting in the loss of signal lock. As mentioned
in Section 2.1, the received RF signal strength from GPS satellites is extraordinarily
weak, which means that it does not take a high-powered jammer to disrupt service.
2.3.1 Unintentional Interference
There are copious sources of unintentional interference or disruption of the GPS
service provided by the United States Air Force (USAF). While not as sinister as in-
tentional interference sources, depending on the application, the effects on the ability
to utilize GPS can be detrimental. A GPS receiver can lose lock on a satellite due to
an interfering signal that is only a few orders of magnitude stronger than the mini-
mum received GPS signal strength (-160 dBW, at the Earth’s surface for the L1 C/A
code) [6]. In addition to the amount of power required to lose lock on a satellite, a
GPS receiver requires 6 to 10 dB more carrier-to-noise density to acquire a lock than
it requires for tracking [7]. The Volpe report, published in 2001, listed numerous




• Personal Electronic Devices
• Mobile Satellite Service
• Ultra Wideband Radar and Communications
2.3.2 Intentional Interference
The growing military and civil reliance on GPS worldwide makes it an attractive
target for malicious governments and groups. The US and its allies primarily navigate
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using encrypted P(Y) code, but to acquire that code, most receivers must begin by
tracking C/A code first. The act of disrupting or degrading GPS with the intent to
deny ability to utilize the Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) service is referred to
as Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR). NAVWAR is a broad term which encapsulates
Electronic Support (ES), Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic Protection (EP).
One of the most popular, and most simplistic, GPS disruption techniques is the
GPS Noise Jammer. The Standard Positioning Service (SPS) can be jammed over a
significant area by a one watt airborne jammer. It is estimated that when airborne,
this jammer can knock off an already locked GPS receiver at 10 km, and prevent it
from re-acquiring at a range of 85 km [8].
2.4 Interference Detection and Geolocation
There are numerous technologies employed today that can successfully detect
and pinpoint the source of GPS signal interference. These technologies often aim to
safeguard critical infrastructure by performing complex monitoring of relevant signal
bands to alert key personnel in real time. With one monitoring station, interference
detection and directionality calculation is possible; however, to pinpoint the location
of the interference source, a pre-existing infrastructure of at least three monitoring
nodes is required.
One example of a GPS interference (and spoofing) detection technology is Orolia
Defense and Security’s BroadSense. This device comes in many form factors, ranging
from a 1U rack mountable computer to a device slightly larger than a quarter. Broad-
Sense utilizes sophisticated Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers and
patented jamming and spoofing detection algorithms to detect when the GPS signal
or GPS spectrum is compromised [9].
An example of a GPS interference detection and geolocation technology is the
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GNSS Interference Detection and Analysis System (GIDAS). GIDAS relies on a clus-
ter (three or more) of monitoring stations to pinpoint the actual location of an inter-
ference source. Monitoring stations can be linked together, providing the ability to
safeguard a small region of interest to an entire city or region [10].
2.5 Machine Learning
Machine Learning (ML) is a subset of Artificial Intelligence (AI) focused on pro-
ducing algorithms that generate predictions based on data, while improving their
accuracy over time.
Figure 4: Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning
ML models, unlike classical programming approaches, can produce these algorithms
without explicitly being programmed to do so (see Figure 5). A ML model is trained
to learn the statistical structure of many examples relevant to a task, eventually
allowing the system to define the rules in which to automate the task [11]. That is,
given input data points, the expected output, and a way to determine the performance
of the model, an algorithm can be derived which relates the data to the appropriate
output.
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Figure 5: Machine Learning Paradigm
More specifically, a ML model assumes there is a relationship between a set of input
data and all possible outputs (described in Equation (1)) and aims to learn a function
f that attempts to map the input domain X onto the output domain Y .
Y = f(X) + ε (1)
X is the collection of input data points, Y is a set of all possible predictions, and
ε is a random error term that is independent of X and is zero mean.
Perhaps the most straightforward example of a ML model is Simple Linear Re-
gression. This model predicts a quantitative response Y based on a single predictor
variable X, with the assumption there is approximately a linear relationship between
the two [12]. The assumed linear relationship can be written as:
Y ≈ β0 + β1X (2)
where β0 is the bias, and β1 is a coefficient tied to the predictor. This model aims to
use training data to produce estimates for the model coefficients, denoted as β̂0 and
β̂1. Once the model coefficient estimates are obtained, predictions can be made on a
set of unseen input data by computing:
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Ŷ ≈ β̂0 + β̂1X (3)
where Ŷ indicates a prediction of Y on the basis of X. While a ML algorithm can be
trained to perform well, it is not safe to assume that the model created is a perfect
closed form solution to our problem. Due to this, ML models are often trained to
perform adequately enough on a specific problem.
2.6 Deep Learning and Artificial Neural Networks
Deep Learning, a subset of ML (see Figure 4), is a set of techniques widely em-
ployed for learning via the use of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). ANNs are often
referred to as a ‘biologically-inspired’ programming paradigm enabling computers to
learn via observational data. Deep learning and ANNs are particularly good at pro-
viding solutions to problems such as image and speech recognition, natural language
processing, and continuous function approximation [13]. ANN are comprised of units
named perceptrons and typically consist of three different types of layers: the in-
put layer which contains an input feature vector; the output layer that reflects the
ANNs response; and the layers in between, often referred to as hidden layers, that
contains the perceptrons that connect the input and output. An example of an ANN
is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Single Layer Neural Network
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2.6.1 Perceptron
As previously mentioned, ANNs are well suited for approximating continuous
functions. This capability is achieved using ML models meaningfully constructed with
perceptrons, the basic building blocks of ANNs. Perceptrons have many inputs and
only one output. Figure 7 shows the basic design of a perceptron, while Equation (4)








where N is the number of perceptron inputs, ŷ is the perceptron output, xi is the i
th
perceptron input, wi is the i
th perceptron weight, and g is the activation function.
To allow for multiple inputs for X, Equation (4) can be rewritten as:








w1 . . . wn
]T
thus allowing for the ap-
plication of the activation function to the sum of w0 and the result of a single dot
product in order to solve for the output.
Figure 7: Perceptron Graphical Representation
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Figure 8 offers a simplified representation of the perceptron, where xi are the
perceptron inputs, g is the activation function, y is the perceptron output, and z is
as follows:




Figure 8: Simplified Perceptron Representation
2.6.2 Activation Functions
From Figure 7 it is clear to see that an activation function is used to map an input
to an output. More specifically, a perceptron calculates the weighted sum of inputs,
and then applies an activation function that converts it into the output. There are
two main classes of activation functions: linear activation functions and non-linear
activation functions. An example of a linear activation function is:
g(x) = x (7)
It should be noted that an ANN constructed solely with linear activation func-
tions can only represent linear models, and is no more powerful than a multivariate
linear regression. The true power of an ANN is achieved when using non-linear ac-
tivation functions, as this will allow for the introduction of non-linearities into the
neural network. The non-linearities introduced by non-linear activation functions are
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paramount in a neural network’s ability to learn complex relationships and patterns
in data. Two examples of non-linear activation functions are the Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLu) and Sigmoid functions. A ReLu (see figure 9a) is a function meant to
zero out negative values, and is mathematically described as:
ReLu =

0, x < 0
x, x ≥ 0
(8)
whereas Sigmoid squeezes arbitrary values into the [0,1] interval (see figure 9b), thus






(a) ReLu Activation function (b) Sigmoid Activation Function
Figure 9: Examples of Non-Linear Activation Functions
2.6.3 Loss Functions
Loss functions, denoted as L, are used to measure the cost associated with incor-
rect predictions that an ANN may produce. The main objective of training an ANN
is to minimize the loss, meaning the smaller the loss, the better. The loss represents
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a measure of success in both regression and classification problems. Regression prob-
lems aim to approximate a mapping function from an input variable (or set of input
variables) to a continuous output variable (or set of output variables). Due to the











where f̂(xi) is the prediction that f̂ produces for the i
th observation [12]. The MSE
will be small if the model’s response is close to the true response, and will grow as
the model’s response and true response begin to differ significantly.
2.6.4 Residual Connections
In traditional ANNs each layer feeds into the subsequent layer, until reaching the
output layer. In residual ANNs, each layer feeds into the next layers and select layers
may also feed into predetermined downstream layers. Before providing additional
detail, Figure 10 provides an illustration of this concept.
Figure 10: Residual Network Representation
Residual connections were built on the assumption that since multiple nonlinear
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layers can asymptotically approximate complicated functions, then it must also be
true that they can asymptotically approximate the residual functions [14]. These
residual connections are used to allow gradients to flow directly through an ANN,
bypassing whole layers that may cause the gradients to explode or vanish. Residual
connections also allow gradients to flow throughout an ANN in reverse, which is useful
when performing back-propagation in order to aid in minimizing the loss function.
2.6.5 Conditional Neural Processing
While deep neural networks are great for approximating continuous functions,
they must be retrained for each new function of interest and typically require large
training datasets. Gaussian Processes (GPs) can be trained to infer the shape of a
new function, but are computationally expensive and quickly become intractable as
the dataset and/or dimensionality increases [15].
Conditional Neural Processes (CNPs) aim to combine the flexibility of GPs while
implementing them as ANNs that are trained via gradient descent. More specifically,
CNPs are models that directly parametrize conditional stochastic processes. This
is achieved by parametrizing the mean and variance of a Gaussian distribution for
every target data point. One of the most beneficial properties of CNPs is that they
are flexible with respect to target input values. That is, the model is able to be
queried at resolutions it has not been trained for. This property allows for enhanced
and simplified scalability of CNP implementation.
2.7 Systems Tool Kit
Systems Tool Kit (STK) is a commercial modeling and analysis software applica-
tion developed and maintained by Analytical Graphics, Inc (AGI). STK is used for
modeling, analyzing, and visualizing complex systems along with their sensors and
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communication links, in context of the mission environment.
2.7.1 Scenarios
Each analysis space created in STK is called a scenario. A scenario is a collection
of any number of objects selected by the user that will interact with each other and the
mission environment during the simulation. Each scenario has well-defined temporal
limits for each child-object as well as base units and various other properties. While
only one scenario may exist at any time, data can be exported and reused as necessary
[16].
2.7.2 Objects
At the heart of the STK analysis engine are Objects. Objects are inserted into
scenarios, allowing for the generation of reports and graphics detailing the relationship
between two or more Objects. A few examples of Objects are satellites, aircraft,
ground vehicles, ships, planets, stars, and communication links.
2.7.3 Reports
The STK analysis engine models and analyzes the complex physical layer relation-
ships among all Objects (and the mission environment) in a Scenario. STK provides
this data to the user via Reports which are text files that detail data such as re-
ceived Radio Frequency (RF) power through isotropic antenna, vehicle orientation
and position, and environment power.
2.7.4 External Control and Automation
STK can be launched and commanded by any Windows program that can serve
as an automation client. An automation client can be developed in various languages
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such as Visual Basic, C++, VBScript, Perl, Python, and more [17].
Figure 11: STK External Control and Automation Diagram
The purpose of the automation client is to obtain the current status of STK,
send commands to the STK server, and interpret responses before finally issuing the
next appropriate command. When STK is launched a socket connection is opened on
port 5001. STK will then listen for commands issued over a TCP/IP socket that the
automation client bind is meant to bind to. External control allows for the automation
of repetitive tasks which helps to eliminate the possibility of command syntax errors




The goal of this research is to develop and train a single model that implements
a Conditional Neural Process (CNP) to predict the electromagnetic environment,
given a small subset of context points. The model will output a tensor containing
the parameters of a normal distribution (a mean and a standard deviation) for each
queried target point. Thus, the model will output the mean of the predicted signal-
to-noise ratio as well as the standard deviation for that distribution. The smaller the
standard deviation, the more confident the model is in the answer. Once a model has
been developed, performance will be analyzed by observing the mean and variance of
the predicted response, as well as the Mahalanobis Distance (MD).
The remainder of this chapter will elaborate on details regarding the data simu-
lation and collection, Artificial Neural Network (ANN) architecture, ANN training,
and model evaluation / analysis strategies.
3.1 Data Simulation and Collection
It is important to note that all data used in this research was simulated using
Systems Tool Kit (STK). STK is used to perform high fidelity modeling of radio
interference signal propagation and path loss which will include a latitude, longitude,
and altitude, as well as the total Radio Frequency (RF) power in Decibel Watts
(dBW). STK will also compute access reports among the receive antenna of the
aircraft and the jammers scattered throughout the mission environment, which will
include access time and total RF power in dBW. Finally, STK will compute the
positional data of the aircraft at each time step such as Lat, Lon, Alt, Yaw, Pitch,
and Roll.
Three different scenarios were simulated: A single interference source, double
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interference sources, and triple interference sources. This section will describe the
nature of each simulated scenario, the type of data that was collected from the sim-
ulations, and the collection automation procedures.
3.1.1 Scenario Description
There are three scenarios that are modeled in STK for this research: The single
jammer scenario; the double jammer scenario; and the triple jammer scenario. Each
scenario has a predefined starting Area of Interest (AOI), date-time, environment,
data sampling rate, and vehicle model (STK object). While each scenario inherits
key properties from the base mission environment, there are also various elements
that are unique between each scenario and each scenario run as well such as aircraft
dynamics, jammer location and orientation, and duration.
Although there are three different datasets simulated, each generated dataset in-
cluded one helicopter and anywhere between one to three jammers. The helicopter
provides Latitude, Longitude, Roll, Pitch, and Yaw measurements via an Embed-
ded Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI).
There is also a spectrometer that provides in-band power measurements within a 25
MHz bandwidth centered at GPS L1 frequency, expressed in dBW. The jammers are
equipped with 13 Decibel Isotropic (dBi) directional helix antennas through which a
1 MHz L1 jamming tone is transmitted.
3.1.1.1 Assumptions
This section lists the assumptions made while performing modeling and data sim-
ulation:
• No Body Shading - We assume there is zero signal propagation error due to the
installed antenna pattern platform body shading effects.
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• The transmitted interference signal is steady and does not display any vari-
ations in spatial or temporal dynamics (three-dimensional rather than four-
dimensional interference).
• The helicopter receive antenna is isotropic, with no body or collection antenna
effects.
• There are no terrain effects causing propagation error of additional power loss
between the jammer transmit antenna and the helicopter receive antenna.
3.1.1.2 Interference Sources
For each scenario the helicopter will traverse a randomly generated route while
producing an access report on the communication link between helicopter’s receive
antenna and each jammer facility in play. This access report will provide time ordered
samples of the received signal power level at the front end of the installed antenna.
Contour maps showing representative examples of the jammer lay-downs can be seen
in Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14.
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Figure 12: Contour plot showing the Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) environment
with respect to a single interference source. The color map overlay ranges from blue
where there is minimal EMI, to red where there is substantial EMI.
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Figure 13: Contour plot showing the EMI environment with respect to double inter-
ference sources. The color map overlay ranges from blue where there is minimal EMI,
to red where there is substantial EMI.
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Figure 14: Contour plot showing the EMI environment with respect to triple interfer-
ence sources. The color map overlay ranges from blue where there is minimal EMI,
to red where there is substantial EMI.
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3.1.2 WSMR Dataset
The White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) Dataset is a collection of data that
details the true EMI environment, as well as the EMI environment perceived by
the helicopter as it traverses a predetermined, randomly generated path (shown in
Figure 15).
Figure 15: True EMI environment with helicopter flight trajectory overlay.
The helicopter’s perceived EMI environment will be used as input features, while the
true EMI environment will be output targets. Table 3 details the number of scenarios
successfully simulated, which provided one set of training data each.
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Table 3: Number of successfully simulated datasets by scenario





Each simulated scenario results in the generation of three files; a helicopter dy-
namics file, the communication link description file, and the true AOI coverage file.
The helicopter dynamics file (HELO LLA idx HH MM SS.txt) describes the time
trajectory and orientation of the helicopter sampled at a 0.1 Hz frequency. The com-
munication link description file (RxISOpwr LLA idx HH MM SS.rpt) describes the
helicopter’s receive antennas perceived signal power sampled at a 0.1 Hz frequency.
The AOI coverage file (coverage idx HH MM SS.txt) provides the Figure of Merit
(FOM) values at each grid location in the AOI. The AOI is broken up into 2832
discrete locations with a resolution of 0.01 deg between grid points. Table 4 describes
the simulated datasets.
Table 4: Dataset features simulated by STK, along with the associated data type and
source.






RF Power R (dBW) Spectrum Analyzer
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3.1.3 Data Collection Automation
Scenario simulation and data collection was automated using Python and the STK
integration module. Without automation, a single user would have to generate tens
of thousands of scenarios by hand, introducing the risk of mistakes and tainting the
integrity of the dataset. By automating scenario simulation and data collection, the
possibility of user error leaking into the simulation results was eliminated.
3.2 ANN Architecture
This section elaborates on the architecture of the implemented ANN model. In
Section 3.1 we outlined the features generated by STK in Table 4. These features are
the input features for the ANN, while the output features are the estimated mean
and standard deviation of the desired targets.
The ANN model developed throughout this thesis is a CNP and residual connec-
tions. Figure 16 shows a graphical representation of the implemented model, with
the inputs flowing from the top of the block diagram and producing outputs at the
bottom. The ANN parameters (number of layers, number of residual connections,
etc.) were chosen to reduce training loss, while the ANN hyper-parameters (layer
size, learning rate, etc.) were chosen by performing a Ray-Tune hyper-parameter
sweep.
The ANN begins with an input layer of size (None, None, 6). (The None keyword
alludes to a partially known input shape, and shows that the model does not know the
batch size, or how many measurements are ingested until run-time.) The input layer
is where the helicopter position, orientation, and spectrum analyzer measurements
are ingested by the model. The input layer then feeds into a dense layer with two
outputs. The first output flows through three cascaded dense layers which then flow
into an Add layer along with a residual connection from the first dense layer.
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The output of the Add layer then becomes the input into another dense layer which
flows into a lambda layer along with an input tensor of the targets to be queried. The
purpose of the lambda layer is to tile the average output from the previous dense layer
with the input tensor of targets. The lambda layer output is then concatenated with
the input tensor of targets before flowing into another dense layer with two outputs.
The first output flows through three cascaded dense layers which then flow into an
Add layer along with a residual connection from the previous dense layer. The output
from the previous dense layer has a linear activation function, with a size of (None,
None, 2) which flows into the final activation layer containing a custom activation
function.
The model is developed to predict the distributions (mean and standard deviation)
of each latitude/longitude pair in the target input tensor. To make these predictions,
the model uses the helicopters dynamics and perceived environment. However, it
should be noted that the model has the ability to predict any arbitrary number of
target points, and it is not confined to the target points that are used during the
training sequences.
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Figure 16: Graphical Representation of the Model
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3.3 ANN Training
3.3.1 Custom Loss and Activation Functions
The implemented custom loss is the Negative Log Likelihood (NLL) (seen in Equa-
tion (11)) of the mean and standard deviation, while the custom metric is a mean
absolute error that only uses the predicted mean and true EMI but not the standard
deviation.
NLL(x) = −log(x) (11)
The implemented custom activation function aims to force the standard deviation
to be a positive number. To prevent the standard deviation from being zero, ELUplus1
is used. Exponential Linear Unit (ELU) does not suffer from the problem of vanishing
or exploding gradients [18]. The piece-wise equation for ELUplus1 is as follows:
ELUplus1(x) =
 e
x for x ≤ 0
x+ 1 for x > 0
(12)
Much like ReLu, ELU slowly approaches negative one when negative, so when one is
added to it will slowly approach zero when negative and not explode when larger than
one. This modified ELU is what is implemented as our custom activation function.
3.3.2 Hyper-Parameter Selection
Before training the model, Ray Tune was implemented to assist in finding the opti-
mal hyper-parameter combination. Ray Tune is a Python library designed for scalable
hyper-parameter tuning [19]. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Cyber
Development Network (CDN) was leveraged to perform a 100 experiment hyper-
parameter sweep to help converge on the ideal hyper-parameter combination resulting
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in the minimization of the training set loss. Due to the low probability of over-fitting
mentioned in Section 3.3, there was no validation split, and all data was used for
training. The final set of training parameters that were chosen by experimentation
are itemized in Table 5, as well as the bounds that were experimented.
Table 5: Parameter and value selection bounds for hyper-parameter sweeping and
model selection.
Parameter Lower Bound Upper Bound
Targets 32 512
Batch Size 32 256
Initial Learning Rate 1e-6 0.001
Latent Size 16 512
Dense Units 8 1024
A Population Based Training (PBT) approach was taken while hyper-parameter
sweeping was conducted. PBT allows for exploitation of previously discovered de-
sirable hyper-parameters, dedicates more training time to promising models, and
can adapt the hyper-parameter values throughout training [19]. The only inter-
experiment hyper-parameter that was perturbed was the learning rate which is sched-
uled for reduction by a factor of 0.8 per epoch.
3.3.3 Training Details
Each scenario stripped the first 100 times steps sampled at 0.1 Hz. The reason
for choosing 100 time steps is due to the variable length of the randomly generated
helicopter trajectory, not all datasets have more than 100 samples available. Model
training parameters were initialized as shown in Table 5 and 300 training epochs
were performed with 300 steps each. Batched scenarios are randomly selected from
the collection of all possible scenarios. Each epoch resulted in the model seeing 75,600
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scenarios per epoch. Due to this approach there is a small probability that the model
would be exposed to the same scenario multiple times in the same epoch, but the
chance of being exposed to the same targets is highly unlikely and does not warrant
the use of a validation set or pose a large risk of over-fitting. Model weights are
updated after each batch, and a model checkpoint event is executed upon detection
of an improved training loss.
We initialize the learning rate as 0.0004 and schedule reduction by a factor of
0.8 when learning stagnates. That is, if there is no improvement in the training loss
after 10 epochs, the learning rate is reduced. The training sequence will then go
through a cool-down phase for 10 epochs before reducing the learning rate if it is still
stagnant. No early stopping is implemented, thus the training sequence will end after
500 epochs and the weights of the best model are saved to file.
3.4 Methods of Analysis
3.4.1 Mean, Variance, and Mahalanobis Distance
The model is developed to output a Gaussian mean and variance for each target,
and is trained with respect to the NLL (Equation (11)) of the true scenario EMI
environment. The output mean serves as the model’s prediction of what the signal
to noise ratio is at each target point. The output variance serves as the uncertainty
in the model’s prediction. The MD is a measure of the distance between a point
P and a distribution D and is a generalization of the idea of measuring how many
standard deviations away P is from the mean of D [20]. Given a set of observations
~x = (x1, x2, x3, ..., xN)
T from a set of observations with mean ~µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3, ..., µN)
T
and a covariance matrix S the MD can be defined as [21]:
DM(~x) =
√
(~x− ~µ)TS−1(~x− ~µ) (13)
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The concept of MD can be visualized in Figure 17, where it can be observed that
even though observations in Y are equidistant from the mean at (0,0), the value of
the MD is not the same.
Figure 17: Each observation in Y is the same distance from the mean at (0,0). How-
ever, the MD varies (note the color scale). This is because MD considers the covari-
ance of the data [22].
Given a covariance matrix S, which happens to be one dimensional, the squared





where x is an observation from a set of observations with mean y and s is the standard
deviation of x and y over the sample set. It is also important to note that the squared
MD follows the chi-squared distribution with n degrees of freedom, where n is the
number of dimensions of the normal distribution. The probability density function














2 , for x and k > 0 (15)
By constructing contour plots of the mean, variance, and MD the performance
of this model can be analyzed. The mean contour plot (Figure 18) shows what the
predicted EMI environment looks like, based off of the input features. The covariance
contour plot (Figure 19) shows the model’s confidence in its predictions. The MD
plot (Figure 20) shows the actual performance of the model adjusted for confidence,
however it must be noted that this plot is not something that can be constructed in
real time, but rather is used to analyze the performance of the model on test data.
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Figure 18: Example plot of the ANN’s response mean.
Figure 19: Example plot of the standard deviation of the ANN’s response.
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Figure 20: Example plot of the Mahalanobis Distance of the ANN’s response.
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3.4.2 Q-Q Plot
In the field of statistics, a Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot is a probability plot,
allowing for the comparison of two probability distributions by plotting their quantiles
against each other [23]. The purpose of Q-Q plots is to find out if two sets of data
come from the same distribution. That is, if data is believed to be Gaussian, a Q-
Q plot shows just how Gaussian that data truly is. By plotting the Quantile’s of
two separate datasets against each other, if the two data sets come from a common
distribution, the points will fall along a 45 degree reference line. An example Q-Q plot
where sample observations are compared to the Standard Normal Distribution can be
seen in Figure 21. If the sample quantiles do not belong to the same distribution as
the theoretical quantiles the constructed Q-Q plot will portray either a bias, increased
variance, or both.
To analyze the performance of the ANN, we will be comparing the squared MD
(D2M) quantiles to those of the chi-squared distribution (χ
2). If the model is truly
outputting a Gaussian distribution for each target point, then the quantiles should
match, and we say the model behaves neutrally. If the D2M quantiles are lower than
those of the χ2, we say the model is aggressive. If the D2M quantiles are higher than
those of the χ2, we say the model is conservative.
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Figure 21: The Q-Q plot produces an approximately straight line, suggesting that
the two sets of sample data have the same distribution [22].
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter discusses the results of the Artificial Neural Network (ANN) pre-
sented in Chapter III. Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 will elaborate on hyper-parameter
selection and training results, while section 4.3 provides a description of the test sce-
narios. The chapter then closes with presentation and discussion of test results for
the single, double, and triple jammer scenarios in Section 4.4.
4.1 Hyper-Parameter Selection Results
After the hyper-parameter sweeping discussed in Section 3.3.2 concluded, the op-
timal hyper-parameters were discovered. The hyper-parameters are displayed in Ta-
ble 6. Figure 22 provides a visualization of the Population Based Training (PBT)
results on a per-experiment basis.
Table 6: Parameter and value selection bounds for hyper-parameter sweeping and
model selection. The rightmost column reflects the optimal set of parameters chosen
by experimentation across 100 trials.
Parameter Lower Bound Upper Bound Optimal Value
Targets 32 512 504
Batch Size 32 256 252
Initial Learning Rate 1e-6 0.001 0.0004
Latent Size 16 512 197
Dense Units 8 1024 748
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Figure 22: Visualization of hyper-parameter PBT results per experiment. 100 con-
secutive experiments with randomized hyper-parameter combinations were performed
and the training loss is plotted against the iteration number. It can be observed that
certain hyper-parameter combinations performed better than others, thus the purpose
of this sweep was to find the optimal combination.
4.2 Training Results and Analysis
The model was edited to portray the optimal hyper-parameters discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1 and trained for 500 epochs. The model quickly converges to the minimum
training loss of -1.67673111 after only 312 epochs (as observed in Figure 23), and
the model weights are saved to memory. The result of this training is a collection of
weights, that when initialized in the implemented ANN architecture, result in a model
that provides the lowest loss on the training dataset. Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plots
detailing the models collective performance on the training dataset can be observed
in Figures 24 to 27. Table 7 shows the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the model
response broken out by jammer scenario, as well as collectively.
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Table 7: Model response RMSE of the collective training samples, as well as by
scenario. The RMSE for the one jammer scenario is much lower than the two and
three jammer cases, indicating potential over-fitting to the one jammer case.
Scenario Samples RMSE (dBW)
One Jammer 43,199 0.148
Two Jammer 21,296 6.522
Three Jammer 15,000 5.636
Combined 79,495 0.133
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Figure 23: Negative Log Likelihood of the model response mean along with the
Mean Absolute Error of the standard deviation model response. The Negative Log
Likelihood plot omits the first training epoch as to avoid scaling issues. Both plots
show both the loss per epoch as well as the 5 epoch moving average.
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Figure 24: Q-Q plot displaying model response across all training samples. It can be
observed that over the entire training set the model was conservative in its predictions
until an error of about 1.6, where it became conservative. The model then became
aggressive again when the error reached 2.7.
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Figure 25: Q-Q plot displaying model response across all one jammer training samples.
It should be noted that the model response is near identical to Figure 24, which may
indicate over-fitting to the one jammer case.
46
Figure 26: Q-Q plot displaying model response across all two jammer training sam-
ples. It can be observed that over the entire training set the model was aggressive in
its predictions until an error of about 1.6, at which point it became conservative.
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Figure 27: Q-Q plot displaying model response across all three jammer training sam-




Once training has been completed and the model results appeared to have gener-
alized to the training set satisfactorily, five test data sets were generated for each of
the jammer scenarios (single, double, and triple jammers). By not sequestering a test
data set prior to testing, and generating a test data set post-training, we guarantee
that the model has never seen the test data before. The three simulated data sets
consist of one, two, and three jammers respectively, which are randomly oriented,
as in a real-world scenario there is no way to know the jammer lay-down in a con-
tested environment. (Note, the jammer lay-down, modulation scheme, and antenna
parameters were generalized as to not elevate the classification of this research.) A
helicopter will fly into the mission environment and traverse a fixed route, rather
than a randomized one, before returning from whence it came. The test dataset was
designed to mimic a helicopter flying into a contested Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI) environment, losing Global Positioning System (GPS) lock, performing a data
collection maneuver, and heading back to where it was deployed from. Figures 28,
34, and 40 provide a visualization of the jammer lay-downs of the test data set.
4.4 Test Results and Analysis
In order to gauge the performance of the model, there are several observables to
consider. These are the true EMI environment, predicted EMI (mean of the Gaus-
sian), and the covariance. Using these observables, the model prediction error and
Mahalanobis Distance (MD) can be calculated, and a Q-Q plot can be generated.
While the predicted mean and covariance will show the model’s prediction of the
EMI environment and its prediction confidence, the error will show how wrong the
model was at each target location. The MD will show the performance adjusted
for the confidence, and the Q-Q plot will aggregate many samples and show if the
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model is actually parameterizing a Gaussian or not. This is turn will show whether
the model is conservative or aggressive as well as any apparent bias. The following
subsections will include figures for each of the described observables, but it should be
noted that these are representative samples taken at random and may not represent
the entire population.
4.4.1 Single Jammer Case
In this subsection we show results from the one jammer case. Figure 28 provides
visualization of the true EMI environment, while Figure 29 shows a contour plot of
the ANN’s prediction as to what the EMI environment is for each target point. The
dotted black line represents the trajectory that the helicopter followed throughout
the duration of the scenario. Along this trajectory a spectrum analyzer, position,
and orientation reading are sampled at 0.1 Hz and fed into the ANN described in
Chapter III.
Figure 30 is a contour plot of the ANN’s response variance and provides a visu-
alization of the ANN’s confidence in its response. If we plot the difference between
the true EMI environment from Figure 28 and the predicted EMI environment from
Figure 29 we get the ANN prediction error, as seen in Figure 31.
Once the MD is calculated for each target point the Squared MD, D2M , can then
be calculated. After extracting the Quantiles from the D2M , and plotting against the
Quantiles from the Chi-Squared distribution, χ2, we obtain the Q-Q plot shown in
33.
By calculating MD such as described by Equation (13), Figure 32 can be generated,
which will show the performance adjusted for confidence of the ANN.
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Figure 28: Single Jammer Truth EMI.
Figure 29: Tri-Contour plot providing visualization of ANNs prediction of EMI En-
vironment in the single jammer scenario. The dotted black line is the trajectory of
the helicopter throughout the scenario.
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Figure 30: Tri-Contour plot providing visualization of the ANNs confidence in its
response.
Figure 31: Single jammer ANN EMI environment prediction error magnitude.
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Figure 32: Single jammer ANN Mahalanobis Distance from truth.
Figure 33: Single jammer Q-Q plot showing that for this single jammer sample, the
model is aggressive.
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By observing the true EMI environment (Figure 28) and the predicted EMI en-
vironment (Figure 29) we see that the model was able to accurately predict the EMI
environment. Figure 30 displays the models variance and portrays the the model was
more confident in it’s prediction along the route that the helicopter traveled. The er-
ror of the models response (Figure 31) shows that the model had a difficult time trying
to approximate the complex functions required to predict the jammer sidelobes. The
Q-Q plot (Figure 33) allows us to ascertain that, for this single jammer scenario, the
model is aggressive. This is the result of a model that was regularly over-confident
in its predictions. However, this was not the case for all of the one jammer scenarios.
Figure 47 shows that, over the collective one jammer training samples, the model
response is fairly neutral.
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4.4.2 Double Jammer Case
In this subsection we show results from the double jammer case.
Figure 34: Double Jammer Truth EMI.
Figure 35: Tri-Contour plot providing visualization of ANNs prediction of EMI En-
vironment for this double jammer sample. The dotted black line is the trajectory of
the helicopter throughout the scenario.
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Figure 36: Double jammer ANN EMI environment prediction error.
Figure 37: Tri-Contour plot providing visualization of the ANNs confidence in its
response.
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Figure 38: Double jammer ANN Mahalanobis Distance from truth.
Figure 39: Double jammer Q-Q plot showing that for this double jammer sample, the
model is conservative.
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By observing the true EMI environment (Figure 34) and the predicted EMI envi-
ronment (Figure 35) we see that the model was able to accurately predict the resultant
EMI environment of only one of the two jammers. In fact, the model predicted EMI
emitted by only one of the jammers, causing reason to believe that this model is
actually over-fit to the single jammer dataset. Figure 37 displays the models variance
and portrays the the model was more confident in it’s prediction along the route that
it traveled. The error of the models response (Figure 36) shows that the model had
a difficult time trying to approximate the complex functions required to predict two
jammers at once. The Q-Q plot (Figure 39) allows us to ascertain that, for the double
jammer test data set, the model is conservative. This is the result of a model that
was regularly under-confident in its predictions.
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4.4.3 Triple Jammer Case
In this subsection we show results from the triple jammer case.
Figure 40: Triple Jammer Truth EMI.
Figure 41: Tri-Contour plot providing visualization of ANNs prediction of EMI En-
vironment for this triple jammer scenario. The dotted black line is the trajectory of
the helicopter throughout the scenario.
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Figure 42: Triple jammer ANN EMI environment prediction error.
Figure 43: Tri-Contour plot providing visualization of the ANNs confidence in its
response.
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Figure 44: Triple jammer ANN Mahalanobis Distance from truth.
Figure 45: Triple jammer Q-Q plot showing that for this triple jammer sample, the
model is conservative.
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By observing the true EMI environment (Figure 40) and the predicted EMI envi-
ronment (Figure 41) we see that the model was able to accurately predict the resultant
EMI environment of only one of the three jammers. In fact, the model predicted EMI
emitted by one jammer. However, in one of the scenarios the model actually predicted
EMI emitted by two of the three jammers, providing reason to possibly dismiss the
previous belief that the model is over-fit to the single jammer dataset. This likely
indicates that the model requires exposure to more training data. Figure 43 displays
the model’s variance and portrays the the model was more confident in its prediction
where it believed that the jammer was placed, rather than along the observed trajec-
tory of the helicopter. Once again, the error of the model’s response (Figure 42) shows
that the model had a difficult time trying to approximate the complex functions re-
quired to predict multiple jammers simultaneously. The Q-Q plot (Figure 45) allows
us to ascertain that, for the triple jammer test data set, the model is conservative.
This is the result of a model that was regularly under-confident in its predictions.
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4.5 Results Discussion
In the one jammer case the representative sample showed that the model response
was always aggressive, while the collective samples show that the model is actually
fairly neutral (as seen in Figure 47). We hypothesized that this depends on which
parts of the jammer contour (main lobe, side lobes, or back lobes) were sampled for
ingestion by the model. This is likely due to the model’s struggle with approximating
the complex functions required to predict side and back lobes. That is, the more
side and/or back lobes that the model ingests the more conservative its response.
To assist in approximation of these complex functions, the model could potentially
benefit from increased hidden layer depth.
In the two and three jammer case the representative sample showed that the
model response was always conservative. However, the collective samples from the two
jammer case showed the response was mildly aggressive before turning conservative
at an error of about 2.7. The collective samples from the three jammer case showed
the response was consistently aggressive.
To have the two and three jammer case match the performance of the one jammer
case, the model likely needs to be exposed to more training data from the two and
three jammer scenarios. An interesting observation about the three jammer collective
samples is that the model response is always aggressive. This could be due to the fact
that the model is over-fit to the one jammer case and with three jammers oriented
in such a small Area of Interest (AOI), the jamming contours closely resemble a one
jammer lay-down. Table 8 shows the RMSE of the model response broken out by
jammer scenario, as well as collectively. It can be observed that the combined RMSE
is an order of magnitude than that of the training dataset displayed in Table 7. This
indicates that the model may benefit from being exposed to additional training data
to assist with generalization to the training data set.
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Table 8: Model response RMSE of the collective test samples, as well as by scenario.
The combined RMSE of the test data set was an order of magnitude higher than
that of the training data set, indicating that additional steps must be taken to assist
model generalization to the training dataset.
Scenario Samples RMSE (dBW)
One Jammer 5 2.987
Two Jammer 5 3.137
Three Jammer 5 2.894
Combined 15 1.676
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Figure 46: Q-Q plot displaying model response across all test samples. It can be
observed that over the entire training set the model was aggressive in its predictions.
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Figure 47: It can be observed that over the entire one jammer test set the model
response was fairly neutral. Predictions were mildly conservative until an error of
about 1.0, at which point it became mildly aggressive.
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Figure 48: It can be observed that over the entire two jammer test set the model
response was mildly aggressive until an error of about 2.7, at which point it became
mildly conservative.
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Figure 49: It can be observed that over the entire three jammer test set the model
response was continuously aggressive. This could be due to the model over-fitting to
the one jammer case.
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V. Conclusions
In conclusion, we have presented a problem in which a helicopter is traversing a
predefined route before finding itself amid a contested Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI) environment. An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was developed and trained
which used vehicle dynamics and spectrum analyzer features in order to predict the
EMI environment given only a small subset of points in the mission environment.
By using the flexibility of Conditional Neural Processes (CNPs), and the ability to
extract prior knowledge from training data, we have demonstrated the ability to
perform prediction of the EMI environment without the need of a distributed network
of monitoring nodes.
It has been shown that the model developed in this thesis, while it could use
improvements, has the capability to predict the EMI environment as well as providing
a measure of confidence in the prediction. For the one jammer case the model was
observed to behave fairly neutrally. The model response for the two jammer case
was aggressive before the error reached 2.7, then it became conservative. The three
jammer case model response was consistently aggressive. The single, double, and
triple jammer test set had a Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of 2.988 dBW, 3.137
dBW, and 2.894 dBW respectively and a RMSE of 1.676 dBW collectively.
In the following section we propose multiple ideas that could aid in the improve-
ment of the model.
5.1 Future Work
For future work the first proposal that would benefit this research would be el-
evating the security classification level of this research and use any and all jammer
specifications and lay-downs that our intelligence community may have gathered in
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the past. Second, adding extra input features such as: additional receive antennas,
multi-frequency spectrum analyzer readings, and the conversion of helicopter’s posi-
tion from LLA to Local-Level coordinates may benefit the ANN. Third, this research
would likely benefit from a much larger dataset, increased ANN depth, and more ex-
tensive hyper-parameter sweeps, ideally massaging the ANN to the point where it is
able to learn more complex approximation functions to better model the side lobes of
the interference sources. Fourth, fewer assumptions when simulating the data would
provide more realistic training features. That is, it should not be assumed there is
no antenna or aircraft body shading, or that there are no terrain effects. Fifth, the
test set would ideally use non-simulated features from an actual Joint Navigation
Warfare Center (JNWC) Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) test event to test
the model. With these future work propositions implemented, this thesis work would
move closer to the point where a machine learning solution could be implemented to
solve the JUON CC-0575.
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